According to the theory of International Political Economy (IPE), states are often incentivized to rely on rather than constrain powerful corporations. For this reason, IPE provides a useful lens to explain why efforts to govern Artificial Intelligence (AI) at the international and national levels have thus far been developed, applied, and enforced unevenly. Building on recent work that explores how AI companies engage in geopolitics, this position paper argues that some AI workers can be considered actors of geopolitics. It makes the timely case that governance alone cannot ensure responsible, ethical, or robust AI development and use, and greater attention should be paid to bottom-up interventions at the site of AI development. AI workers themselves should be situated as individual agents of change, especially when considering their potential to foster Algorithmic Collective Action (ACA). Drawing on methods of Participatory Design (PD), this paper proposes engaging AI workers as sources of knowledge, relative power, and intentionality to encourage more responsible and just AI development and create the conditions that can facilitate ACA.

My dog contributes to climate change. I've been a vegetarian for over a decade. It's not because of my health, or because I dislike the taste of chicken or beef: It's a lifestyle choice I made because I wanted to reduce my impact on the planet. And yet, twice a day, every day, I lovingly scoop a cup of meat-based kibble into a bowl and set it down for my 50-pound rescue dog, a husky mix named Loki. Until recently, I hadn't devoted a huge amount of thought to that paradox.

Our findings reveal that even small collectives (controlling less than 0.01% of the training data) can achieve up to

Collective action against algorithmic systems provides an opportunity for a small group of individuals to strategically manipulate their data to get specific outcomes, from classification to recommendation models. This effectiveness will invite more growth of this type of coordinated actions, both in the size and the number of distinct collectives. With a small group, however, coordination is key. Currently, there is no formal analysis of how coordination challenges within a collective can impact downstream outcomes, or how multiple collectives may affect each other's success. In this work, we aim to provide guarantees on the success of collective action in the presence of both coordination noise and multiple groups. Our insight is that data generated by either multiple collectives or by coordination noise can be viewed as originating from multiple data distributions. Using this framing, we derive bounds on the success of collective action. We conduct experiments to study the effects of noise on collective action. We find that sufficiently high levels of noise can reduce the success of collective action. In certain scenarios, large noise can sink a collective success rate from $100\%$ to just under $60\%$. We identify potential trade-offs between collective size and coordination noise; for example, a collective that is twice as big but with four times more noise experiencing worse outcomes than the smaller, more coordinated one. This work highlights the importance of understanding nuanced dynamics of strategic behavior in algorithmic systems.

On many learning platforms, the optimization criteria guiding model training reflect the priorities of the designer rather than those of the individuals they affect. Consequently, users may act strategically to obtain more favorable outcomes, effectively contesting the platform's predictions. While past work has studied strategic user behavior on learning platforms, the focus has largely been on strategic responses to a deployed model, without considering the behavior of other users. In contrast, look-ahead reasoning takes into account that user actions are coupled, and -- at scale -- impact future predictions. Within this framework, we first formalize level-$k$ thinking, a concept from behavioral economics, where users aim to outsmart their peers by looking one step ahead. We show that, while convergence to an equilibrium is accelerated, the equilibrium remains the same, providing no benefit of higher-level reasoning for individuals in the long run. Then, we focus on collective reasoning, where users take coordinated actions by optimizing through their joint impact on the model. By contrasting collective with selfish behavior, we characterize the benefits and limits of coordination; a new notion of alignment between the learner's and the users' utilities emerges as a key concept. We discuss connections to several related mathematical frameworks, including strategic classification, performative prediction, and algorithmic collective action.

Machine learning models often preserve biases present in training data, leading to unfair treatment of certain minority groups. Despite an array of existing firm-side bias mitigation techniques, they typically incur utility costs and require organizational buy-in. Recognizing that many models rely on user-contributed data, end-users can induce fairness through the framework of Algorithmic Collective Action, where a coordinated minority group strategically relabels its own data to enhance fairness, without altering the firm's training process. We propose three practical, model-agnostic methods to approximate ideal relabeling and validate them on real-world datasets. Our findings show that a subgroup of the minority can substantially reduce unfairness with a small impact on the overall prediction error.

Our findings reveal that even small collectives (controlling less than 0.01% of the training data) can achieve up to

We study how participation in collective action is articulated in podcast discussions, using the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement as a case study. While research on collective action discourse has primarily focused on text-based content, this study takes a first step toward analyzing audio formats by using podcast transcripts. Using the Structured Podcast Research Corpus (SPoRC), we investigated spoken language expressions of participation in collective action, categorized as problem-solution, call-to-action, intention, and execution. We identified podcast episodes discussing racial justice after important BLM-related events in May and June of 2020, and extracted participatory statements using a layered framework adapted from prior work on social media. We examined the emotional dimensions of these statements, detecting eight key emotions and their association with varying stages of activism. We found that emotional profiles vary by stage, with different positive emotions standing out during calls-to-action, intention, and execution. We detected negative associations between collective action and negative emotions, contrary to theoretical expectations. Our work contributes to a better understanding of how activism is expressed in spoken digital discourse and how emotional framing may depend on the format of the discussion.

Given that data-dependent algorithmic systems have become impactful in more domains of life, the need for individuals to promote their own interests and hold algorithms accountable has grown. To have meaningful influence, individuals must band together to engage in collective action. Groups that engage in such algorithmic collective action are likely to vary in size, membership characteristics, and crucially, objectives. In this work, we introduce a first of a kind framework for studying collective action with two or more collectives that strategically behave to manipulate data-driven systems. With more than one collective acting on a system, unexpected interactions may occur. We use this framework to conduct experiments with language model-based classifiers and recommender systems where two collectives each attempt to achieve their own individual objectives. We examine how differing objectives, strategies, sizes, and homogeneity can impact a collective's efficacy. We find that the unintentional interactions between collectives can be quite significant; a collective acting in isolation may be able to achieve their objective (e.g., improve classification outcomes for themselves or promote a particular item), but when a second collective acts simultaneously, the efficacy of the first group drops by as much as $75\%$. We find that, in the recommender system context, neither fully heterogeneous nor fully homogeneous collectives stand out as most efficacious and that heterogeneity's impact is secondary compared to collective size. Our results signal the need for more transparency in both the underlying algorithmic models and the different behaviors individuals or collectives may take on these systems. This approach also allows collectives to hold algorithmic system developers accountable and provides a framework for people to actively use their own data to promote their own interests.

The integration of AI into daily life has generated considerable attention and excitement, while also raising concerns about automating algorithmic harms and re-entrenching existing social inequities. While the responsible deployment of trustworthy AI systems is a worthy goal, there are many possible ways to realize it, from policy and regulation to improved algorithm design and evaluation. In fact, since AI trains on social data, there is even a possibility for everyday users, citizens, or workers to directly steer its behavior through Algorithmic Collective Action, by deliberately modifying the data they share with a platform to drive its learning process in their favor. This paper considers how these grassroots efforts to influence AI interact with methods already used by AI firms and governments to improve model trustworthiness. In particular, we focus on the setting where the AI firm deploys a differentially private model, motivated by the growing regulatory focus on privacy and data protection. We investigate how the use of Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DPSGD) affects the collective's ability to influence the learning process. Our findings show that while differential privacy contributes to the protection of individual data, it introduces challenges for effective algorithmic collective action. We characterize lower bounds on the success of algorithmic collective action under differential privacy as a function of the collective's size and the firm's privacy parameters, and verify these trends experimentally by simulating collective action during the training of deep neural network classifiers across several datasets.